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Achieving Post-Acquisition
Success: The Role of
Corporate Entrepreneurship
Neil Thomson and Peter McNamara
Corporate entrepreneurship can play a central role in the integration of mergers and
acquisitions. This paper describes a study spanning seven years for six mergers and
acquisitions that involved UK, US and Swedish acquisitions of East German firms. The
authors used the respective strengths of corporate entrepreneurship to predict the
likely success or failure of each M&A, with very accurate results when they revisited the
companies in 2001. The authors draw further lessons from the study by linking
corporate entrepreneurship to the learning organisation and providing practical lessons
for managers. c 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Introduction
Many challenges face companies in the wake of a takeover. For
the acquirer, it must successfully integrate its new asset and seek
to reap benefits from its outlay. For the company that has been
taken over, it must find its place in the new corporate culture
yet not lose its confidence amid the shake-up. We argue that
these and other problems can be addressed and resolved through
the development of corporate entrepreneurship. Corporate
entrepreneurial activities help the acquisition to add value to the
corporation as a whole. To explore this point we undertook six
case studies of foreign acquisitions of firms in East Germany.
Our aim is to illustrate, through this dataset, that corporate
entrepreneurship plays an important role in the success of an
acquisition. To explore these issues we collected data on the six
acquisitions over the period 1995–1996 and then observed the
success or failure of the acquisition in the summer of 2001.
Acquisitions that are successfully integrated into the new
organisation will not be divested, while acquisitions that cannot
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integrate will be divested in the years after acquisition. We find
that firms which created an environment that fostered corporate
entrepreneurship soon after acquisition were the firms that
remained within the acquirer’s portfolio into the 21st century.
Those that did not foster corporate entrepreneurship in the years
following acquisition had been divested by 2001. Two of the
firms had a medium level of corporate entrepreneurship and in
these cases the hostility of the business environment played a
moderating role in portfolio divestment.
Theoretically this paper is unusual in that we highlight the
role of corporate entrepreneurship in the post-acquisition
(integration) phase of acquired firms, rather than focusing upon
corporate entrepreneurship in the context of organic growth by
mature organisations. We define and explore the concept of cor-
porate entrepreneurship and by using contrasting case studies,
amongst other methods, we isolate and study its constituents.
These constituents are investigated via surrogate variables, which
are used to predict the future success of M&As. All the internal
constituents of corporate entrepreneurship can be influenced, to
differing degrees, by management, so emphasising that the suc-
cessful integration of M&As via corporate entrepreneurship is a
practical managerial goal. We recognise that the internal develop-
ment of an organisation can potentially be dominated by events
outside the firm and so we also employ a measure of external
market pressures.
The generic problem
In addressing the scope of our research, we drew partially upon
the work of Charles Hampden-Turner.1 He emphasised the
importance of seeing managerial problems as dilemmas to be
resolved rather than decisions to be made. A dilemma is the
juxtaposition of perceived opposites, for example, simultaneous
pursuit of economics of scale and economies of flexibility. The
management of the acquiring corporation is faced with an initial
dilemma, namely how to integrate efficiently the acquired firm into
the systems of the wider corporation without destroying distinctive
features of the acquired firm that will generate new wealth for the
corporation. Efficiency of integration may well imply suppression
of the identity and distinctive behaviours of the acquired firm
in favour of rapid integration into the structures of the wider
corporation. Assuming that a market price has been paid, then
wealth is only created if the acquisition adds something distinc-
tive to the corporation. New wealth can be created through novel
combinations of distinctive knowledge, resources and capabili-
ties. Can these additions be preserved or created by the acqui-
sition when integration efficiency is optimised? The difficulty of
this generic dilemma is emphasised by the 44 per cent failure
rate experienced by new acquisitions.2 Previous studies have
highlighted the importance of managing the process of post-
acquisition integration.3 We explore an important, but over-
looked dimension of post-acquisition integration, namely cor-
porate entrepreneurship.
We argue that corporate entrepreneurial activities can play an
important role in the identification of valuable distinctive knowl-
edge and capabilities of the acquired firm and their integration
into the new corporation. We view the constituents of corporate
entrepreneurship as the cement that binds the two diverse com-
munities brought together by a takeover. The success of post-
takeover integration is reflected in the ability to address a second
dilemma. All the sample firms were faced with the choice of
reducing costs by laying off workers, or keeping employees to
gain the positive benefits of organisational slack. The second
dilemma is therefore, save costs today through redundancies or gain
potential benefit in the future through innovative redeployment of
underemployed human resources. The common element in solving
each dilemma is corporate entrepreneurship.
Definition of corporate entrepreneurship
The concept of corporate entrepreneurship received much atten-
tion in academic writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s.4 The
goal of corporate entrepreneurship is for large organisations to
recreate the benefits of flexibility and innovation, often associated
with small firms, in a large firm setting. Our sample firms reflect
this scenario. Corporate entrepreneurship involves teams within
a firm, led by intrapreneurs or corporate champions who pro-
mote entrepreneurial behaviour inside large organisations, pro-
actively engaging in risky projects that seek to create new, innov-
ative, administrative procedures, products and services that facili-
tate organisational renewal and growth.5 Corporate entrepren-
eurial activities act as a counter-balance against the natural
tendency of organisations towards inertia and creation of core
rigidities. It has long been argued by corporate entrepreneurship
studies that there is a positive relationship between corporate
entrepreneurship and organisational performance.6
The factors making up corporate entrepreneurship (see col-
umn 1, Table 1) are taken from a key study on corporate
entrepreneurship, namely Baden-Fuller and Stopford.7 These fac-
tors are both complex and broad. In Table 1 (column 2) we offer
measures for these general concepts, focusing on narrower and
more directly observable dimensions. We do not claim that these
measures capture the full breadth of each factor, but argue that
they act as useful proxies, or surrogates for them, enabling inter-
esting insights into the more general concept of corporate
entrepreneurship. We view these surrogates as an observable
bridge for managers between the academic basis of corporate
entrepreneurship and practical, measurable management chal-
lenges.
Justification of corporate entrepreneurship surrogates
The key constituents of corporate entrepreneurship proposed by
Baden-Fuller and Stopford are: learning capabilities, team orien-
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Table 1. Measurement of corporate entrepreneurship via surrogates
Corporate Corporate Measurement of
entrepreneurship— entrepreneurship—- surrogates (further
constituents surrogates in this details provided in
paper. Appendix A)
Learning capability  Presence and  Continuum from
integration of diverse no integration of
perspectives. diverse perspectives to
presence and
integration of diverse
perspectives
Team orientation  Shared language.  Absence or
presence of a shared
technical and
managerial language
 Degree of  Continuum from
information withholding no free exchange of
by team members. information to free
exchange of
information
Experimentation  Slack resources  Continuum from
available for no slack resources to
experiments. much slack present in
system
 Culture supportive of  Continuum from
experimentation. active opposition to
active support of
experimentation with
current business
practices
Ambition  Aspirations beyond  Continuum from
current resources. low to high
aspirations
tation, experimentation and ambition. A fifth constituent is res-
olution of dilemmas. Dilemma resolution can be progressed via
a process of incremental experimentation; thus this is subsumed
into the concept of experimentation in our study. We have meas-
ured the concept of acquisition success as the survival, or non-
divestment, of the East German firm by its western acquirer from
takeover up to 2001. Non-divestment, or survival within the
portfolio of the acquirer, of the East German firm was a key goal
of the state’s privatisation process and has been used as a metric
of success in prior studies.8 The rationale for selection of surro-
gates for each of the four constituents of corporate
entrepreneurship is provided below (and summarised in Table
1). Further discussion of each of these constituents of corporate
entrepreneurship and illustration from our dataset is provided
in the data analysis section of this paper.
Learning capability and team orientation
According to Grant and March,9 because organisations are inani-
mate constructs they do not learn themselves: rather knowledge
creation is an individual activity. The key role of a firm in the
process of knowledge creation is to bring together the diversity
of ideas and perspectives of individuals and harness that creative
energy in team activities. Teams of individuals experiment with
combinations of ideas to create innovative processes and pro-
ducts that no one individual could have conceptualised or practi-
cally produced alone. Organisational learning, and by extension
corporate entrepreneurship, is a team activity. For entrepreneur-
ial teams to operate successfully they need two basic building
blocks: a shared language to communicate their ideas and suf-
ficient trust both of each other and the firm, to share their
insights. Nonaka et al.10 have argued that the process of inno-
vation by teams requires dialogue between team members and
conversations across functional boundaries to facilitate pro-
ductive exploitation of new product and process concepts. Such
dialogue requires a common basic language and perspective,
which acts as a foundation upon which teams can productively
share ideas and create new products and services. Constructive
dialogue requires that team members have sufficient trust of each
other and the organisation that they can share their most valu-
able ideas without fear of alienation or personal loss. A clear
signal that team orientation has broken down is when individuals
within a team hoard important information and are unwilling
to pool it with others in the team as part of the process of exper-
imentation.11 A lack of team orientation implies that corporate
entrepreneurial activities will fail.
Experimentation and ambition
In his review of the literature on organisational learning, Huber
observed that at the heart of organisational learning lies exper-
imentation:12 a novel combination of resources by teams to cre-
ate new products and processes. Experimentation is not, how-
ever, possible without slack resources that can be recombined.
Even where slack resources are available for redeployment or
reconfiguration it requires the will of management and staff to
make experiments happen. Thus a critical aspect of experimen-
tation is whether or not there exists a culture of experimentation
within the firm itself. Hitt et al.13 have observed that corporate
entrepreneurship teams can be formally created by a firm; how-
ever, without the active support of experimentation by manage-
ment and a desire to experiment on behalf of the team,
important new products and processes will not be generated.
Thus both availability of slack resources and a culture of exper-
imentation are the surrogates we apply to the constituent exper-
imentation.
The surrogate for ambition is a strategic intent to expand the
firm through creation of new products and/or movement into
new geographic markets. Baden-Fuller and Stopford observed
that ambition (or aspirations) ‘capture the goal of progress and
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continuous improvement by finding better combinations of
resources’.14 To successfully expand through new product devel-
opment these firms would need to innovatively reconfigure their
current resources. Equally, to expand into new geographic mar-
kets they would need to redeploy resources and retrain
employees to service these markets. Such strategic intentions
require finding better combinations of resources and are there-
fore good surrogates of the constituent ambition.
Corporate entrepreneurship does not enjoy a standard or com-
monly agreed definition.15 Three types of corporate
entrepreneurship appear in literature, namely, corporate ventur-
ing, transformation of existing businesses, and changing of
industry rules.16 Like Baden-Fuller and Stopford, we concentrate
upon the second, or transformation type, as our focus is upon
acquisitions of firms in a rapidly transforming economy all of
which were renewal situations. Transformational corporate
entrepreneurship can be viewed as entailing the reallocation of
existing resources and the creation of new capabilities with the
goal of organisational renewal and improved economic perform-
ance.17 Such transformation requires the effort of teams as
opposed to the isolated efforts of a few individuals.
Methodology
Six mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving the purchase of
an East German firm by non-German firms were researched,
using 36 in-depth interviews. Much of East Germany’s industry
was privatised by a specially created authority, the Treuhandan-
stalt (THA), in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Empirically this paper is unusual in that although the vast
majority of acquisitions of East German firms from the THA
were by West German companies, we studied the acquisition of
six East German companies by non-German firms. Foreign
acquisitions ensure even greater than normal potential exposure
to upheaval, as differing national cultures are added to the
already heavy mixture of influences on integration and change.
Cross-cultural differences do, however, represent an opportunity
for corporate entrepreneurs. National variations in culture,
administrative processes and capabilities of firms offer the poten-
tial to create new and unique organisational capabilities that can
form the basis for organisational renewal and improved perform-
ance.
Although we made a careful choice regarding size of firms and
sectors, the selection of actual firms within these sectors relied
upon those who granted interview access to their management
and employees. Interviewees ranged from senior to junior man-
agement within the East German firms. Based on these interviews
the two most extreme firms were developed into cases to be used
as contrasts. Details about the sample firms are summarised in
Table 2. Please note that throughout this paper company and
interviewee names are not reported as all requested that their
identities remain confidential. All interviews were translated into
Table 2. Details of M&As researched
1 2 3 4 5 6
Data source Acquirer Size of Details of Business sector Number of
and location nationality M&A to ownership employees
total ops.
Company A: US and UK 0–5 per 100 per cent Utilities 2100
Saxony and cent acquisition
Saxon-Anhalt
Company B: UK 0–5 per 100 per cent Heavy electrical 400
Berlin-East cent acquisition equipment
Company C: Sweden and UK 0–5 per East German CEO Water/water 50
Saxon-Anhalt cent retained small purification systems
shareholding
Company D: UK 0–5 per 30% of shares held Architectural and 240
Saxony cent by East German engineering services
managers
Company E: All UK 0–5 per 100% owned West Agricultural industry 20
East Germany cent German subsidiary
expansion
Company F: US 50 per cent 25% of shares stayed Specialist chemicals 100
Saxony with THA
English. The bulk of the data collection took place in 1995–1996,
although additional data was collected in 2001, allowing com-
parison of our predictions with actual outcomes. As noted earl-
ier, details of the measurement of the constituents of corporate
entrepreneurship are provided in Table 1.
Appendix A contains the details of how we measured the sur-
rogates of corporate entrepreneurship and the success or failure
of an M&A.
Data analysis
Where a corporate entrepreneurial environment is developed
then over time a stream of innovations in terms of organisational
capabilities (novel and effective organisational systems, processes,
routines) and products will emerge from the acquired firm. The
greater the presence of a given measure of the underlying con-
stituent of corporate entrepreneurship (as detailed in Table 1),
then the greater the strength of the corporate entrepreneurial
environment. By extension we predict that the stronger the pres-
ence of the constituents of corporate entrepreneurship inside a
given firm, then the more likely it is to be successful at the gener-
ation of new capabilities or products. Thus we detail the strength
of each of these constituents in the sample firms and we use this
analysis as a prediction of long-term ability of the acquired firm
to survive.
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Measurement of the strength of the constituents of
corporate entrepreneurship
Where managers can identify the key factors, or building blocks,
of corporate entrepreneurship in a new acquisition, then an
exciting opportunity exists to nurture the seeds of corporate
entrepreneurship in the early post-acquisition stage. Once these
factors are isolated, their importance can be determined and
managers can influence them.
By analysing our six case companies we were able to see that
the factors of corporate entrepreneurship were relevant to the
experience of firms acquired by western partners in the old East
Germany. As already mentioned, these factors are quite broad
concepts that are difficult to observe objectively as a whole and
so we used surrogates to evaluate them. These surrogates capture
an important ingredient of each of the more general factors of
corporate entrepreneurship. An assessment of the presence and
importance of the constituents of corporate entrepreneurship to
each of the sample firms is summarised in Table 3.
We will now discuss each of the four constituents of corporate
entrepreneurship as outlined in Table 1 in the context of the six
M&As. We will combine a theoretical understanding of each of
these factors with findings from our case studies. We will also
analyse the business environment that each of these firms oper-
ated within, assessing the extent to which this environment was
positive or negative. We will then discuss the relationship
between corporate entrepreneurship, acquisition survival and the
moderating effect of a positive or negative business environment.
This will enable us to make predictions of the likely long-term
success or failure of each of these M&As from the perspective
of 1996–1997. In subsequent sections of the paper we will com-
pare our predictions with the data on the survival of the firms
as collected in 2001. Such a comparison across time allows us to
demonstrate whether or not the presence of corporate
entrepreneurship is a robust predictor of survival.
Learning capability—importance of diversity
The creation of new organisational knowledge is strongly influ-
enced by the interaction between individual knowledge and the
firm’s knowledge base. The firm’s knowledge is embedded in its
routines, culture, group behaviours and hierarchy. On average,
the knowledge stored in these systems will be a more accurate
reflection of reality than the individual’s view.18 However, organ-
isations are inanimate objects. It is only through the diversity of
individuals’ knowledge that the firm can change its view of the
world and hence its capabilities.19 Diversity of individual knowl-
edge bases may suggest novel combinations of the firm’s current
resources. The diversity that an M&A brings can thus be an excel-
lent vehicle for organisational learning.
Diversity can be injected into the firm by two means: the exist-
ence of organisational mavericks and personnel turnover.20 Mav-
ericks are people who are slow to be indoctrinated by the organ-
isational orthodoxy and thus challenge the current ways of
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operation. While there is evidence in the case companies that
such people were rare in pre-privatisation times, ironically they
may have surfaced post-acquisition, where individuals resisted
the pressure to accept capabilities imposed upon them from the
western partner. In the case of Company F such resistance was
negative, in that it did not prompt dialogue and integration of
the best aspects of each firm’s capabilities across the new firm.
In this company eastern managers chose to hoard information,
thus refusing to infuse the organisation with their insights and
knowledge. While this was maverick behaviour, it was also
destructive. In companies C and D, where levels of diversity of
perspectives were high, mavericks did exist but were embraced
by the organisation as a whole (see Table 3). The reluctance of
these firms to accept immediately the western partner’s capabili-
ties without adaptation spurred on the process of corporate
entrepreneurship.
Complementing the role of mavericks in the process of knowl-
edge and capability creation is personnel turnover. New person-
nel bring with them new ideas and their unfamiliarity with the
firm’s capabilities leads them to question and challenge the cur-
rent orthodoxy. Personnel turnover was very high in our sample
on two levels. The most important of these was the arrival of,
usually a few, new people from the western partner at the senior
management level. The other was the general turnover of
employees in the restructuring of ex-combines, where in the
majority of cases as many as 80 per cent of jobs were lost. In
this latter situation, no new personnel were involved but the
unfreezing effect of job uncertainty often led to less rigid mind-
sets.
This combination of high levels of personnel turnover and
mavericks within the eastern firms produced an environment
rich in creative tension. New personnel and mavericks brought
insights into alternative ways of running the business, thus
enabling the firm to envision new methods of working. The very
fact that M&As’ formation is often accompanied by middle and
top management turnover21 ensures change at the highest level.
Our sample of East German M&As often saw initially very high
management turnover, due to the weeding-out of political
appointees and older managers, usually occupying positions at
the highest level. The managerial systems of the eastern firms
prior to takeover promoted staff on the basis of politics and age,
rather than merit. Such a managerial system stifles mavericks
and personnel turnover and discourages differences. This posed
a considerable challenge for the new management. One manager
captured the profile of employees in Company E by observing
that they were like civil servants and quite risk adverse, unwilling
to experiment and change organisational systems. Instead they
followed a strategy of keeping the firm strongly embedded within
the old, moribund supplier–buyer network. He noted that:
“It was just important for us to have people with connec-
tions and also who were, to a certain extent, known to us
through connections. We could probably be criticised for
not having noticed beforehand that those in higher pos-
itions would not be the youngest. We weren’t interested in
age. Following on from that, we ended up with a bundle of
people over 50 years of age, a high percentage of whom
could not handle the change in their way of life. Specifically,
the change from East German standards to the demands
placed by a West German subsidiary of a British firm. What
I mean here is commitment, motivation, goals, work
methods etc.”22
Team orientation
In corporate entrepreneurial activities teams, rather than hier-
archies, form the key to the creation of new managerial processes,
which push the firm to invest in new, or more efficient methods
of organisation and production, and innovative products and
services.23 As argued earlier, team orientation requires both
shared language and lack of information hoarding by team mem-
bers. Given the rigidity of the former hierarchies of East German
industry, a key to the rejuvenation of this sample of firms was
to encourage teams to be entrepreneurial, create new knowledge
and insights about the direction of the firm, and thus refresh the
firm in spite of the negative effects of conformity that hierarchy
promotes. Team members will be unwilling to share information
where trust between individuals or the firm is absent. Lack of
trust has often been argued to be a central factor in inhibiting
the successful operation of teams,24 in particular, for their ability
to create new organisational knowledge and challenge the ortho-
doxy of hierarchy.
Information hoarding
There is a strong relationship between the existence of trust
between team members and the absence of information hoard-
ing.25 If the process of intermingling the incoming and existing
company cultures is not carefully managed then communication
breaks down, trust between functional groups and individuals
within the firms is diminished and thus corporate entrepreneur-
ial learning is impeded. This may in part be a response to a
failure by the two parties to understand each other’s differing
perspectives. If understanding emerges then a key ingredient of
team-based corporate entrepreneurship, namely trust, shared
worldview and ability to communicate across disciplinary
boundaries to develop inter-disciplinary products and services,
can develop. If not, specialists may retreat into information
hoarding or functional balkanisation as a strategy to maintain
their employment, but to the detriment of team effectiveness.
The most striking example of information hoarding and its detri-
mental impact upon corporate entrepreneurship in our sample
occurred in Company F. One of the German managers noted
that a culture of fear emerged where German employees worried
about the security of their jobs and responded with knowledge
hoarding. As she put it:
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“…One keeps one’s knowledge to oneself in order to some-
how or other become indispensable. The fear of losing your
job, that is always in the background. We are all at such an
age that if we were to have to leave the firm we would find
it almost impossible to get a new position and we’ve all got
a long way to go to retirement. …”
“I used to try and delegate my work, now I prefer to finish
it myself.”
These individuals and the teams within which they operated
had deep reservoirs of technical knowledge which the new
owners wished to access. However access was hindered by the
German employees’ fears, which resulted in high levels of infor-
mation hoarding and an inability of teams to engage in corporate
entrepreneurial activities. The German employees felt that they
were going to be sold out. However, interviews with the western
managers indicated that this was not the case and they believed
that the German employees had a lot to offer and were willing
to learn. Expectations were in this case acutely different and so
the opportunity to develop synergistic learning never occurred.
Common organisational language
Creation of a shared language is essential for team members to
have a high degree of involvement with each other in the conduct
of entrepreneurial activities and also in the creation of the trust
required for teams to undertake activities successfully.26 A shared
common language is especially important in the context of cross-
functional teams, where communication failures triggered by the
lack of a common language and shared perspective can lead to
functional balkanisation and the breakdown of corporate
entrepreneurship. This can impede the completion of important
tasks such as new product development and launch.27 The devel-
opment of a shared language is a key element of both successful
acculturation and corporate entrepreneurship. The absence of
both impedes post-acquisition success.
For example, in the case of Company B there was the physical
language barrier of German and English. Company B only
realised that their German colleagues did not speak English and
that the British managers they sent to East Germany did not
speak German, upon the arrival of several managers from the
UK after the completion of the acquisition! The deeper element
of common language is the establishment of a common technical
language and frame of reference, from which cross-functional
groups, within the old firms and across the new combined firm,
can effectively communicate.
Within our sample of eastern firms, there were surprisingly
rich opportunities for shared language both within and more
importantly, across functional specialities. This enabled cross-
functional teams to combine efficiently, allowing relatively
efficient application of current capabilities and routines in the
very harsh economic climate of the former communist bloc. One
of the most exciting synergistic opportunities for east/west
M&As was the opportunity to combine this expertise in the
application of current operations with western firms’ strength in
knowledge creation and innovation while avoiding system-wide
core rigidities (which plagued combines). However, we found
from our sample that, due to the actions of the acquiring firms,
this opportunity went largely unrealised.
Low personnel turnover, high slack (discussed below), coupled
with high degrees of socialisation inside and outside of work,
fostered a common language within and across functional teams.
Such interaction is argued to be a key ingredient to successful
corporate entrepreneurship.28 Some combines in the old East
Germany employed whole towns, e.g. Leuna. There was a very
high degree of social interaction between workmates compared
with the average western firm. All this was likely to give the
employees a relatively high degree of shared personal experiences,
fostering transfer of tacit knowledge, coupled with a lower need
to rely on relatively more inefficient explicit knowledge transfer
mechanisms. Within the established group, the potential to apply
current knowledge bases is likely to have been relatively high,
given the right motivational elements. However, with teams now
completely broken up and many new owners not recognising the
need to develop a new intra-firm common language for knowl-
edge to be accessed and employed efficiently, the opportunity to
combine two unique knowledge bases may have passed.
Experimentation—creating an environment of
calculated risk taking
Availability of slack resources
Organisational slack is ‘the pool of resources in an organisation
that is in excess of the minimum necessary to produce a given
level of organisational output’.29 Many authors argue that slack
plays a positive role in creating increased rates of learning by
permitting higher levels of social interaction and thus facilitating
the creation of new product or service offerings and innovative
organisational capabilities.30 Through creative usage of slack
resources, management can promote an environment in which
flexibility in work practices and experimentation in the creation
of new products or processes is encouraged. Slack also enables
creation of information overlaps between workers, thus stimulat-
ing knowledge sharing and easing job rotation. Job rotation is
an important activity insofar as it stimulates knowledge sharing,
triggering new insights into how to design cross-functional infor-
mation processes more efficiently. Additionally, job rotation also
ensures that the firm is less exposed to the sudden departure of
an employee who holds critical competitive knowledge.
Nohria and Gulati31 empirically showed that there is a clear
inverse U relationship between a firm’s learning, performance
and slack. Put simply, this relationship implies that there is an
equilibrium level of slack that facilitates learning and perform-
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ance. Too much slack has a negative effect on performance as
has too little. The referenced study found that the optimum level
of slack was about 5 per cent.
The presence of slack in our sample companies is shown in
column 4 of Table 3. Company D offers an insight into the role
that slack resources play in experimentation. This company had
departments that were ‘heavy’ in personnel. Rather than making
cost savings in the short term through redundancies, the firm
experimented with new, productive activities to which the skills
of these employees could be applied. Company D invested in
retraining some of the personnel, transferring them from the
Berlin operation, where they were an excess resource, to an
export offensive in Russia. This export offensive was a success,
providing the firm with an increased share of the Russian market.
A vital task in the reduction of excess levels of slack is to ident-
ify what knowledge is tacitly stored inside the purchased unit
and where that knowledge resides. Once this knowledge is ident-
ified, the firm needs to establish what is surplus to requirements,
what could be shed and what strategies should the new firm
develop to nurture valuable knowledge and transfer it across the
old organisational boundaries, embedding it in the routines,
hierarchy and culture of the new firm. Evidence in our sample
indicates that western acquirers often viewed slack, or overlaps
in employees’ duties and knowledge, as completely surplus to
requirements and hence engaged in hasty mass redundancies, but
the experiences of Company D illustrate that slack resources can
be internally redeployed to create wealth. Such hasty reduction
in absorbed slack represents a missed opportunity to obtain syn-
ergy from M&As.
Culture of experimentation
Firms that promote corporate entrepreneurship encourage teams
to try out new ideas, to modify administrative procedures and
explore new product possibilities. These experiments need not
be large scale, nor need failure of a single experiment be viewed
as failure by the team. The process of improvement builds on
the experience gained from both successful and unsuccessful
experimentation, providing insights into what works and what
does not. An interviewee from Firm C explained that its new
owners fostered a culture of experimentation, enabling it to
explore the market for new, more efficient and effective supply
relationships. Previously, project teams were not free to experi-
ment with changes in sources of supply, due to the rigidity of
the combine. The new management enabled one team to experi-
ment with new sources of building supplies with the goal of
improved efficiency in the supply chain. As he put it:
“I am no longer forced to use certain building materials; I
can choose them freely together with the builder… Now I
take decisions individually, wood, bricks, stone, etc.”
Without the existence of some slack, experimentation could
not take place. In the case of an M&A, without the development
of some level of common language by which partners across old
organisational boundaries can communicate, experiments, which
seek to integrate capabilities across the old firms will be doomed
to failure. With information hoarding, experimentation will not
flourish. Finally, without diverse perspectives, experiments will
generate little new insights. Thus experiments act as the lens
through which some of the other constituents of corporate
entrepreneurship—namely, organisational slack, diverse perspec-
tives, lack of information hoarding and common language—
combine to add value in the form of learning which creates new
or integrates old capabilities.
In the case of our sample firms, the new western owners had
the freedom to introduce experiments as the East German oper-
ation was usually small in relation to the overall group size. Table
2 shows the relative size of the M&As in the sample and with
the exception of Company F, all were insignificant in terms of
comparative size to the combined group. The real return ema-
nates from developing techniques to surface hidden capabilities
in East Germany and then, if they prove successful, to export
them to other countries or regions. If the new capabilities that
arise from experimentation prove to be less effective than
methods that existed previously, then the negative impact can be
either reversed, or limited to the periphery of the new firm in
East Germany. This process of experimentation is quintessen-
tially about the willingness of corporate entrepreneurs to take
measured risks, where benefits can be leveraged across the organ-
isation, while downside risk is carefully managed.
Developing and nurturing hidden capabilities takes time. The
opportunity cost of this time is slower implementation of staff
pruning measures. The lower the fixation on instant financial
returns, the more leeway to experiment is available. Company F
provides a classic example of lack of ability to experiment. The
aforementioned large size of the East German operation, plus the
insistence of the THA (who retained shares and seats on the
board) that no experiments could take place, led to an impasse
and eventual failure. Companies C and D seemed to be left alone,
with the rate of return on the investment being the only inter-
ference from HQ. Isolation allows experimentation but has an
inherent danger that the results may not be of use to the
whole group.
Ambition—aspirations beyond current resources
Hamel and Prahalad’s idea of stretch and leverage resonates
within the concept of corporate entrepreneurship.32 Stretch is a
mismatch between (current) resources and aspirations. In other
words, if a firm wants to expand quickly, reduce costs dramati-
cally, upgrade quality substantially then this could be difficult
given current resource levels and usage. The current resources
need to be stretched to achieve ambitious goals. Resource lever-
age seeks to do just this, to get the most out of current resources,
i.e. ‘a bigger bang for the buck’. Leverage occurs by reassigning
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the resources in a manner so that they more tightly fit the
ambitious output goals. A stark contrast with the other source
of resource productivity, downsizing to become leaner, ‘reducing
the buck paid for the bang’.
We contend that the cut or stretch options are not either/or
alternatives. Certainly in all our sample companies cutting took
place. Firm E was the one exception because here the acquisition
acquired only a shell company in East Germany and expanded
it as an add-on to the West German subsidiary. Cutting as a
strategy is hardly surprising given the horrendous levels (more
than 80 per cent) of over-manning in East German industry.
However, those sample firms we found to be more successfully
shaping their own future—Companies C and D—were actively
throttling up their aspirations. They were attacking new market
sectors and geographically expanding. The other firms were not
increasing their product offerings nor extending their markets.
Corporate entrepreneurship and the competitive
environment
The level of environmental turbulence that a firm faces may be
a moderating factor between corporate entrepreneurship and
survival. Where the environment is benign then greater levels of
corporate entrepreneurship should lead to greater success. In the
face of a very turbulent, negative, environment the innovative
activities of corporate entrepreneurship may not be sufficient to
guarantee survival. The constituents of corporate
entrepreneurship discussed above do not exist in a vacuum. We
can assess the existence of corporate entrepreneurship by gauging
the presence or absence of its constituents. However, certain
sample companies (A and B) as well as our successful contrast
case (D) exhibited medium to high corporate entrepreneurship
but according to management were still having problems making
profits. The reason being that environmental market forces were
offsetting the positive internal learning gains. These firms were
surviving in 1996, but were not all profitable.
Variables in the competitive environment
An assessment of the existence of a ‘Positive/Negative Business
Environment’ is important because the six companies were all
subject to the macro level economic effects experienced by the
post-wall East German economy. However, some were operating
in markets protected from the general collapse in demand. Com-
pany A enjoyed a utility monopoly. Companies C and D faced
a moderately hostile environment, though they did benefit in
the early days after their purchase from the short, reunification
construction boom. Company F had a complex product that was
difficult for rivals to imitate and competed within a stable market
in terms of demand. Both Companies B and E faced very hostile
environments with dramatic competitive pressures, as well as
plummeting demand. Weightings were given to each of the six
companies’ environments, by using Porter’s five competitive
forces.33 The analysis is summarised in Table 4. It is interesting
to note that our contrast company (Company F) had probably
the second most benevolent market conditions but as we shall
see, due to internal factors, could not translate this into corpor-
ate success.
A summary (Table 5) shows: the existence of corporate
entrepreneurship, the type of business environment and an
assessment of present success of the various firms. In column 4,
based on the research data obtained in 1996, we advanced our
Table 4. Assessment of business environment using Porter’s five forces model
1 2i 3i 4i 5i 6i 7ii
Company Threat of new Buyers Threat Suppliers Rivalry amongst Type of
entrants bargaining from bargaining existing business
power substitutes power competition environment
+ or 
A Low (legally Low (isolated Low (Some Low (Company Low
sealed off consumers, Gov. gas in A is vertically (cosy oligopoly)
market) price control) heating) integrated)
+ + + + + +++++
B Quite high High One major Low Low High Intense and
steep cost of buyer, state fierce international
entry but cheap telephone competition
imports company
  + +  
C Quite high Quite high, large Low Low Quite high rising
entry barriers buyers, such as competition as
exist, but other other water foreign specialist
MNCs are companies, have firms arrive
active market power
  + +  
D Quite high Quite high, large Low Low Quiet high
entry barriers buyers, such as increasing in
exist, other oil refineries, intensity as other
MNCs have have market East German firms
arrived power modernise
  + +  
E Low Low diverse High Low Critically high BSE
customer base switch to crisis decimated
other demand
protein
sources
+ +  +  
F Low Quite high large Low Low Company F Low heavy speciality
oil refinery is vertically product
buying power integrated
+  + + + +++
i Points are allocated as follows: Low=+; Quite High=; High= ; Critically High=.
ii Results here are obtained by adding the pluses and minuses in the row.
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Table 5. Corporate entrepreneurship, predicted success 1996 and actual success 2001
1 2 3 4 5
Company Degree of corporate Type of business Our Prediction of September 2001
entrepreneurship environment + Success in 1996i Success or failure
Column 6, Table 3 or 
Col. 7, Table 4
A (US) Medium +++++ Predicted success. Limited success:
One of the three original
owners divests.
Business continues to
prosper.
B (UK) Medium  Predicted uncertain Failure:
future: Original owner divests.
Competition between New foreign owner, but
corporate business continues to shrink
entrepreneurship and in size.
environment.
C (Sweden) High  Predicted success. Success:
Continued ownership
Business holds position in
market.
D (UK) High  Predicted success Success:
Continued ownership
Business holds position in
market.
E (UK) Low  Predicted failure. Failure:
Original owner divests.
Management buyout, business
continues to exist but
exposed to potential spread
of agricultural epidemics.
F (US) Low +++ Predicted failure. Failure:
Original owner divests.
New foreign owner, but
business undergoes sustained
reduction in size.
i This prediction of success or failure was made based upon the levels of corporate entrepreneurship present in
1996. High levels of corporate entrepreneurship in 1996 generated a prediction of survival, while low levels led to
a prediction of failure. Where levels of corporate entrepreneurship were medium survival was predicted based
upon the positive or negative state of the business environment.
predictions. We expected those firms having high levels of cor-
porate entrepreneurship, to be likely long-term successes.
Looking forward
The predicted impact of corporate entrepreneurship on
success
High combinations of the factors promoting corporate
entrepreneurship means that even in the face of a slightly hostile
environment, companies C and D should prosper and survive.
Company A has a medium level of corporate entrepreneurship,
which combined with a quasi-monopoly environment means
that it too was predicted to survive. The future survival of Com-
pany B was predicted to be uncertain given the hostility of its
environment coupled with only medium levels of corporate
entrepreneurship. Given their low levels of corporate
entrepreneurship companies E and F were predicted in 1996 to
fail in the long term. Failure was predicted irrespective of
environmental conditions, be they positive (Company F) or
negative (Company E). Shortly after the end of the initial data
collection period in 1996 Company F failed and was divested by
its US owner. Its very low levels of corporate entrepreneurship
limited its ability to expand, thus placing pressure on headcount
in direct opposition to the goals of its minority shareholder the
THA. The position became untenable and the firm was returned
to the THA. Company E survived the BSE crisis, though this
weakened it considerably. This crisis did not, however, trigger an
innovative response through corporate entrepreneurial activities.
Early impact of corporate entrepreneurship
We have argued earlier that a consequence of a positive corporate
entrepreneurship environment should be the creation of new
capabilities. At the end of data analysis in 1997, some of these
firms had high and medium levels of corporate entrepreneurship
as we summarised in Table 3. We might, therefore, expect that
the process of capability creation had already begun. What are
then capabilities? Put simply, organisational capabilities are pro-
cesses and routines that co-ordinate the firm’s resources (such
as human resources, capital equipment and market intelligence)
into complex resource networks that efficiently and effectively
develop, produce and deliver products and services to the mar-
ket.34
In 1997 data on the six cases gave an indication that new capa-
bilities were appearing in the more successfully integrated com-
panies (C and D). The opposite was true in Company E and
Company F, the unsuccessful contrast case. The focus of our
analysis was upon the acquired firm, thus we focus upon new
capabilities within East German acquisitions, not the inter-
national owner. Emergence of new capabilities within the
acquired firms was identified through our interviews with East
German managers and employees. In our discussion below we
provide quotations from these interviews to support their claims.
In Company D a capability of customer-driven management
had to be transposed from the western firm and integrated with
a production-dominated view of the old East German organis-
ation. This process of transposition and ultimate integration, or
corporate entrepreneurship, was facilitated by a well-managed
integration of the different company cultures. An interviewee in
Company D expressed this transformation from production
orientation to a customer-driven approach as follows:
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“Out of the former continuously filled order book grew a
behavioural pattern of the planner. The planner was for-
merly at the centre not the customer. Now the picture has
turned around 180 degrees, now the customer is king.”
Company C made great efforts to devolve decision-making to
lower levels in the organisation. Its managing director stated:
“Today we have a lower level of management who have the
instruments at their control to make things happen,
allowing me less deep involvement in projects and more
opportunity to affect outside factors.”
However, just making an organisational change does not
guarantee immediate success, especially in an atmosphere where
historically decisions were always pushed upwards. Clearly new
capabilities are not created overnight. The managing director
continues:
“Its not too easy to convert people to accept more responsi-
bility, this is currently a hot topic, which the new organis-
ation structure makes very visible.”
The positive corporate entrepreneurship and new capabilities
experienced in companies D and C contrasts with the experience
of Company F. According to the western managing director of
Company F, for the eastern acquisition to be successful it was
necessary to create a new capability, namely responsive R&D,
which both existed in and was a key source of success in the
western firm. However, this capability was not successfully trans-
posed or integrated across the two firms. An interviewee
explained the state of R&D in Company F prior to acquisition
as follows:
“Whereas in most western companies, you would get
monthly reports against goals and objectives for R&D pro-
jects, and/or you would have periodic communications,
meetings. They never did any of this. You would never see
a report and it would just kind of disappear and hopefully
one day they would come and say: ‘well we think we have
solved the problem and we are ready to talk to you about
it’. But along the way they would never give you a status
report.”
Company F attempted to transpose a capability of responsive-
ness in a unidirectional manner. It did not encourage partici-
pation by the eastern employees in the development and adop-
tion of an R&D responsive capability. Efforts to integrate the
differing company cultures in general, and R&D in particular
were poorly managed. This ultimately resulted in a rejection of
cross-firm knowledge and hence capability transfer and inte-
gration of R&D.
2001 survival: interactions between corporate
entrepreneurship and environmental turbulence
As we can see from Table 5, not all the firms continued to pros-
per by 2001. Companies C and D survived as predicted and were
not divested by their original foreign owners. Company A sur-
vived but lost one of the three original foreign purchasers there-
fore we classify it as only a limited successful acquisition. Compa-
nies E and F were divested as predicted and while Company E
continues to survive as an independent buy-out its future is
uncertain. Company F was divested and having been acquired
by a new foreign owner has undergone a sustained reduction in
size, thus as both an acquisition and a business it has failed.
Company B was divested to a new foreign owner thus as an
acquisition it too failed, but as a business it continues to decline
in size at the same pace as the market in which it operates.
As predicted firms with high levels of corporate entrepreneurship
both survived and were retained within the portfolio of their
original foreign acquirers. This occurred despite the negative
business environment in which they operated. As we can see
companies C and D were both considered to have an internal
environment in which all the key features of corporate
entrepreneurship were present, though slack resources were dim-
inishing rapidly towards the end of our study in Company D.
The corporate entrepreneurship of these firms has ensured suf-
ficient internal transformation to survive but not to capture large
increases in market share.
Survival of firms with a medium level of corporate
entrepreneurship was very much influenced by environmental
conditions. The key gaps in Company A and B’s corporate
entrepreneurship were the lack of a shared language and low
levels of ambition. In these firms environmental turbulence
played an important moderating influence between level of cor-
porate entrepreneurship and survival. Company A had a medium
level of success as one of its three foreign owners did divest its
share. Company A had low ambition, but was situated in a mon-
opoly market. The removal of that monopoly post-1996 may
have activated a survival instinct triggering initiation of corporate
entrepreneurial activities by filling two key gaps, namely giving
it an ambition and forcing a shared language to be developed.
The original foreign owner (which went bankrupt) divested
Company B prompting our classification as a failure. Company
B was acquired by another foreign firm, however by 2001 it was
facing negative growth in line with its market. Company B faced
a more hostile environment than Company A and also a lower
level of corporate entrepreneurship. For Company A team orien-
tation was feasible if a shared language could be developed, as
information hoarding was not a problem. Company B, however,
lacked any team orientation: teams were both unwilling to share
insights (information hoarding) and unable to do so (due to
the lack of a shared language). Thus a marginally lower level
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of corporate entrepreneurship in Company B, combined with a
considerably more negative business environment led to its fail-
ure. We can see that environmental conditions have an
important moderating effect on the role of corporate
entrepreneurship in influencing the survival of an acquisition.
Companies with low levels of corporate entrepreneurship were
predicted to fail. In line with this prediction soon after 1996
Company F failed, despite being in the second most positive
environment of the six firms. Company E was divested by its
original British owner and is thus classified as a failure. Company
E continues to exist as an independent entity having being
bought out by management, however, the risk of business failure
remains very high. Should further agricultural epidemics such as
foot and mouth disease (FMD) spread across the EU in a similar
pattern to the BSE crisis of the 1990s then Company E is poorly
placed to survive another environmental shock because of its lack
of corporate entrepreneurship.
Company E, as a green-field expansion, had no supply of
organisational slack. Company F had slack resources but was not
dynamically managing these resources through redeployment or
encouraging employees to use slack time to engage in innovative
experimentation. Neither company had developed a learning
capability. In both firms there was a rejection of the cultural
value of the eastern and western firm’s differing approaches,
leading to rigidity in mindsets of respective western and eastern
staff towards each other. Neither group sought to learn from the
diverse experiences of the other. Western management sought to
dominate over the eastern, while the eastern staff engaged in
passive resistance and avoidance of implementation of new busi-
ness practices promoted by the western owners.
Given the lack of dynamic slack resources and the rejection
of learning from diversity of each group it is unsurprising that
in both firms there was not a culture that promoted curiosity and
innovation as expressed through experimentation. Experiments
would have been viewed as threatening by the East German staff.
Experimental failure would not have been viewed as a part of
the process of learning, but rather as a danger for an individual
to be exposed to the floodlights of personal failure. Considering
the above features it comes as no surprise that companies E and
F had an environment of fear and conservatism, not one of
ambition.
Managerial implications
During the 1990s the concepts of organisational learning and
knowledge management, which had been popularised by Argyris
and Schon amongst others in the 1970s, increasingly competed
with concepts such as corporate entrepreneurship for manage-
ment attention.35 It should be noted, however, that the two con-
cepts are complementary, as knowledge creation and learning are
central aspects of corporate entrepreneurship.36 It is our conten-
tion that discussing corporate entrepreneurship is not a retro-
grade step. On the contrary it complements and co-exists with
the learning organisation. Managers operating at the turn of the
21st century are probably more familiar with the learning organ-
isation than corporate entrepreneurship. We hope we have
reiterated the importance of corporate entrepreneurship and by
way of the two questions discussed below wish to convince man-
agers of the practicality of corporate entrepreneurship.
Who is able to influence the key constituents?
The above question seems very superficial. Its obvious answer
being—the management of the M&As. However, a little deeper
reflection is rewarded with the follow-on question of whether
corporate entrepreneurship is a one-way issue, i.e. acquirer
dependent? Certainly each of the constituents can be and were
influenced by the incoming and/or existing management. There-
fore, a case can be made for a purely acquirer-driven integration
process. Given that the western acquirer had the benefits of fin-
ancial clout and management expertise in a market-driven firm,
it would not be surprising to see knowledge transfer being a one-
way process, an eastwards one. However, our research showed
that this interpretation is too simplistic. Incoming management
in companies A, B, E and F failed to develop a shared language
and hence hindered the transfer of knowledge. On the other
hand, the acquired firms turned out not to be helpless victims
of takeover by western firms in the wake of the collapse of the
Berlin Wall. Companies C and D, with eastern stockholding, had
legal countervailing powers in the boardroom to enable their
voices to be heard. Company F showed the other extreme, where
the eastern employees refused the western knowledge transfer in
certain areas and gave up trying to integrate their expertise with
the western firm.
In summary, the initiators of corporate entrepreneurship tend
to be the acquirers but they can spoil the transfer of knowledge
by neglecting the constituents of corporate entrepreneurship. In
a few cases, the acquired company employees inhibited corporate
entrepreneurship and in all cases, for corporate entrepreneurship
to take place, their acceptance and agreement was necessary. The
acquired have the ability to influence information hoarding and
shared language dependent on the level of organisational slack.
By controlling their end of the involvement with the constituents
of corporate entrepreneurship, the acquired firm’s management
and employees can either get their message across to a willing
partner acquirer, or they can attempt to champion their views,
even in the face of a less open-minded acquirer.
How can managers enact or nurture corporate
entrepreneurship after takeover?
This question can be answered by reference to our successful
contrast M&As, Company D. Here we see the successful inte-
gration achieved through eastern co-ownership, mixed with a
bilingual top management and realistic expectations, on both
sides, of where the firm was going. Given this strong basis, the
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first two constituents of corporate entrepreneurship (learning
capability and team orientation) were satisfied. Organisational
slack, although being reduced, was used to encourage infor-
mation exchange as opposed to hoarding and transfer of
resources to experimental new fields. This strong managerial
concentration, on doing the integration correctly in the post-
acquisition phase, paid dividends, at least in the short run. Com-
pany D was successfully riding out the transformation to a mar-
ket-driven company in an increasingly hostile environment. A
benign environment can provide space for a firm to survive.
Company A, was also successful in the short-term but here the
success started from an attractive protected market, not from
internally leveraged resources.
There are advantages in conducting research in extreme situ-
ations, in this case M&As involving moribund ex-combines in
reforming East Germany. One advantage is that the marriages
are between two unequal partners. We have argued that even in
conditions of revolutionary change and uncertainty that man-
agers can influence and overcome the adverse environment
through the fostering of corporate entrepreneurship. Our
research gives instances of successful (and unsuccessful) inter-
vention and indicates that corporate entrepreneurship plays a
role in successful intervention.
Intelligent intervention by managers can bring about post-
acquisition success, via integrating the highlighted variables
necessary to achieve corporate entrepreneurship. According to
the model we have proposed, M&As which survive through the
short-term will succeed in the long-term if they have corporate
entrepreneurship or use a protected market as an opportunity
to change and address their internal constituents of corporate
entrepreneurship. Attention to corporate entrepreneurship can
keep an M&A viable, helping to keep failure at bay. On the other
hand, firms that neglect the constituents of corporate
entrepreneurship will suffer the same fate as Company F, which,
despite a benign business environment, failed.
Conclusions
This paper makes two important contributions to the literature.
The first is to link corporate entrepreneurship to post-acquisition
success. There are many examples in the literature of the rel-
evance of corporate entrepreneurship to the renewal of mature
organisations and the creation of new, innovative businesses
within large firms. The role of corporate entrepreneurship in
post-acquisition integration and survival has received little atten-
tion. This paper seeks to partially fill this gap. We have argued
that fostering an environment of corporate entrepreneurship
may play an important role in the long-term success of an acqui-
sition. The case studies are not proof of a causal relationship
between corporate entrepreneurship and acquisition success,
however, the data analysis does suggest that such a relationship
may well exist. Such a relationship would have important impli-
cations for the literature on both corporate entrepreneurship and
post-acquisition integration.
Second, this paper takes up the recent call of scholars for stud-
ies to take account of time.37 This research is not ethnographic,
however, it is longitudinal. We not only make predictions of the
likely impact of corporate entrepreneurship on the success of an
acquisition, but return after a considerable time to observe the
long-term survival of these firms. We collected data real-time
in 1995–1996, gaining a contemporary insight into the state of
corporate entrepreneurship inside each of the six East German
firms, we then waited for a seven-year period to observe the long-
term survival of these firms. We would suggest that this is both
unusual and important. It is unusual in that few researchers have
the institutional support to wait seven years to assess the out-
come of a research project. It is important because too often
historical case study research can drift into posthoc rationalis-
ation, where predictions and observation of outcomes are made
at the same point in time, thus prediction neatly matches out-
come. We avoid this trap by taking cognisance of the time
involved in organisational research through separating data col-
lection, analysis and observation of longer-term outcomes.
Appendix A. Measures and methods
Measurement of surrogates
As this was qualitative research, for all the surrogates in-depth
interviews were transcribed and subject to a content analysis. The
assessment of each of the factors was based more on a subjective,
as opposed to mathematical evaluation of the contents. This
means that there is an element of self-selection by the inter-
viewees in measuring the importance of any particular variable.
We find this consistent with the qualitative approach of allowing
the subject to surface the importance of the various factors. How-
ever, the assessments as shown in Table 3, reflect the consoli-
dation of the interviewee answers by the researchers.
1 Diverse perspectives. These were measured as a continuum
from no integration of diverse perspectives to the presence
and integration of diverse perspectives.
2 Team orientation.
(a) Lack of hoarding was assessed on a continuum from no
freedom of exchange to free exchange of information.
(b) Shared language means the existence of a shared technical
and managerial language enabling cross-functional com-
munication and communication between East German
and foreign management. Here the measure is a dichot-
omous yes/no assessment.
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3 Experimentation.
(a) Slack resources available for experiments. Slack resources
were represented on a continuum from no slack present
to much slack present in the system. Questions designed
to measure slack were based on the format suggested by
Bourgeois.38
(b) Culture supportive of experimentation: a continuum
from active opposition to experimentation with current
business practices to active support of experimentation by
employees and management.
4 Aspirations. Here questions were only addressed to higher-
level managers. The questions probed whether new areas of
sales, both geographical or product based, were being
explored. The answers were consolidated on a continuum
from low (no, or few new areas) to high (many new areas).
Measurement of success/failure of M&As
We have defined survival as when the East German firm remains
within the portfolio of the original foreign acquirer up to 2001
and use this as our metric of success. We argue that in this sam-
ple of firms, divestment was a signal of failure in creating new
wealth in the acquired firm, not a signal of success. Where the
acquirer fails to create new wealth in the acquired firm it recog-
nises that it is not the best owner of the firm and hence disposes
of the East German unit. All the firms were subsidiaries and their
financial position was hidden in consolidated accounts in a
foreign country making an accounting definition of success
impossible. Obviously over the long-term, firms can only survive
if they make a profit, so there is a temporal link between survival
and profit. Therefore when reviewing the link between corporate
entrepreneurship and success, recognition should be given to the
internal and external environments and a differentiation made
between the short-term and long-term. Thus we returned to the
sample in 2001 to see if the firms had survived and whether the
original acquirer had divested or retained the East German firm.
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